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Abstract
We develop a model for analyzing the distributional effects of two globalizations
and their interdependence. We distinguish between two trade cost reductions, (i)
trade liberalizations in the 1980s, which increased trade in low-skill-intensive goods
(denoted L-Globalization) and (ii) reductions in communication costs due to the IT
revolution, which raised trade in middle-skill-intensive goods during the 1990s (denoted
C-Globalization). We consider a North-South trade economy in which the North is skill
abundant. A freely traded final good is produced using high-skill services and a bundle
of inputs. Inputs differ on the intensity of middle- and low-skill workers required to be
produced, and are subject to heterogeneous trade costs. In the North, we find that wage
inequality increases in the L-globalization. During the C-globalization, wage polariza-
tion emerges. The relative wage of high- to middle-skill workers increases, while the
relative wage of middle- to low-skill workers is hump-shaped. We find a complementa-
rity between the two globalizations. Wage polarization is delayed by the extent of trade
in the L-globalization. In the South, we find that wage inequality increases in both
globalizations. Finally, we show how asymmetric participation in the C-globalization
of two southern countries generates a discontinuous pattern of specialization. The
southern country participating in the C-globalization specializes in the least and most
skill-intensive traded inputs.
Keywords : globalization, wage inequality, wage polarization, pattern of specializa-
tion.
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1 Introduction
The skill content of North-South trade has changed over the last decades. Figure 1 docu-
ments the evolution of the share of southern exports in industries with skill intensity above
the average skill intensity of U.S. industries. During the 1980s, southern exports increased
relatively more in industries with skill intensity below the U.S. average. In the 1990s, this
pattern reversed and southern exports grew disproportionally more in industries above the
U.S. average skill intensity.1
These changes in southern exports can be exemplified by the bilateral trade of the
United States with Chile and India. Figure 2 shows that in the 1980s, Chilean exports
increased in below-average skill-intensive industries. During the 1990s, Indian exports
rose in above-average skill-intensive industries. We interpret these differential increases
in North-South trade as reductions in different trade costs. Chile underwent a dramatic
trade liberalization in the late 1970s and 1980s,2 while India has benefited from offshoring
of industries and services that make intensive use of information technologies (IT) in the
1990s.3 Our empirical analysis suggests that the trade patterns described for India and
Chile hold more broadly.
Based on this evidence, we distinguish between two globalization processes. First, we
denote by L-globalization the trade Liberalizations occurred during the late 1970s and 1980s
that increased northern imports in low-skill-intensive industries. Second, we denote by C-
globalization the reduction in Communication costs driven by the IT revolution, which
increased northern imports in middle-skill-intensive industries during the 1990s. In our
model, these differences in trade composition arise as a result of differential reductions
in trade costs across skills. Thus, the key feature of our model is to analyze trade cost
reductions that are heterogeneous across skills and over time.
We analyze these two globalizations and their complementarity. We investigate the ef-
fects of the IT-driven trade (C-globalization) on wage inequality and the pattern of special-
ization, and how these effects depend on the extent of trade done during the L-globalization.
We find that the relative wage of high- to middle-skill workers in the North increases
with the C-globalization. On the contrary, the relative wage of middle- to low-skill workers
is hump-shaped as IT-driven trade progresses. This is because the relative wage of northern
middle- to low-skill workers starts to decline when above-average skill jobs are offshored,
1A similar U-shape pattern emerges when looking at the median skill rather than the average, or when
restricting the sample to the U.S. or G-7 countries. A southern country is defined as having less than half
of 2000 U.S. GDP per capita PPP adjusted. Skill intensity is constructed from U.S. census data, based
on educational attainment of workers in different jobs. The average skill intensity of U.S. imports is the
average of the skill intensity of each industry at 3-NAICS level. We use data on trade flows from the Feenstra
database, note that data pre- and post-1984 data come from different sources (Feenstra et al., 2005).
2This pattern is not specific for Chile. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) document that trade liberalizations
in the 1970s and 1980s were biased towards low skill-intensive industries. Amongst others, they cite Hanson
and Harrison (1999) and Robertson (2000, 2004) for Mexico, Currie and Harrison (1997) for Morocco and
Attanasio et al. (2004) for Colombia.
3India is one of the countries which has benefited the most from this new wave of offshoring. Trefler
(2006) documents that India hosted the highest number of new IT services projects (around 19% of the
world total) and call centers (around 12% of the world total) in 2003 and 2004.
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which happens during the C-globalization. This decline in the relative wage of middle- to
low-skill workers together with the increase in the relative wage of high-skill workers has
been termed “wage polarization.”4 Thus, the equilibrium wage distribution tends to wage
polarization as the C-globalization process progresses.
Our first main result shows that there exists a complementarity between the two glob-
alizations. We find that wage polarization is delayed by the extent of trade done during
the L-globalization. The intuition for this result is that trade in low-skill-intensive inputs
increases the average skill requirement of northern industries, which delays wage polariza-
tion. This complementarity result highlights the importance of having a unified view of
the two phases of globalization, which is one of the novelties of our framework. We provide
empirical evidence supporting the complementarity result. We show that countries that
have traded more during the L-globalization experience smaller drops in lower-tail wage
inequality during the 1990s.
We extend our baseline model to allow for two southern countries, with only one par-
ticipating in the C-globalization. We want to capture the idea that there is asymmetric
participation within southern countries because some countries may lack the minimum
stock of specific capital needed to benefit from the IT revolution. Our second main result
shows that asymmetric participation among southern countries generates a discontinuous
pattern of specialization. The southern country participating in C-globalization specializes
in the least skill-intensive L-globalization goods, in addition to C-globalization goods. The
other southern country specializes in the relatively higher skill-intensive goods of the L-
globalization. Wage inequality increases in the former and decreases in the latter. Using
data on Internet adoption, we provide evidence consistent with an asymmetric pattern of
specialization amongst southern countries.
Section 2 provides suggestive evidence supporting our modeling assumptions. We
present evidence consistent with trade liberalizations affecting low-skill-intensive industries
in the L-globalization, and a fall in communication costs mainly affecting middle-skill-
intensive industries in the C-globalization. For the L-globalization, we show that U.S.
tariff reductions were biased towards low-skill-intensive industries during the 1980s. For
the C-globalization, we show that high levels of Routine Task Intensity (RTI) are asso-
ciated with middle-skill-intensive industries. We interpret the RTI index as a proxy for
offshorability in the presence of a reduction in communication costs (IT revolution).5 We
also show that countries with lower communication costs export to the U.S. relatively more
in skill-intensive industries. Finally, we relate changes in U.S. trade openness and changes
4See Autor et al. (2008), Goos and Manning (2007) and the references therein.
5Oldenski (2011) shows that the most routine tasks are the most likely to be offshored. The RTI
measure is closely related to impersonal services, which Blinder (2006) emphasizes as a distinctive element
of C-globalization trade. The use of the RTI is motivated by the observation that goods that can be
electronically delivered (or monitored) are fairly standardized and follow determined procedures. The Index
is taken from Autor and Dorn (2009), who also link the IT revolution with the loss of middle-skill-intensive
jobs in northern industries. In this paper, we focus on the role of offshoring of jobs to the South rather than
the substitution of jobs by computers emphasized by Autor and Dorn.
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in wages across different levels of skill. We find that openness is negatively correlated with
the U.S. wage bill in low-skill-intensive industries in the 1980s. During the 1990s, we find
that this correlation is negative for middle-skill-intensive industries.
Our model, presented in Section 3, features a North-South trade economy. A freely
traded final good is produced in the North by combining a bundle of inputs and high-
skill labor. This bundle is assembled using a continuum of inputs, which are produced by
middle- and low-skill labor in different proportions. Thus, this model can be thought of as
an offshoring decision by northern firms. We assume that the North is skill-abundant and
that there are heterogeneous trade costs across different inputs.
We model the two globalizations as changes in the trade costs of different inputs. There
exists a continuum of inputs z ∈ [0, 1] where z captures how middle-skill-intensive each
input is. The L-globalization is modeled as a reduction in trade costs associated with low-
skill-intensive inputs, that is, with inputs with skill intensity 0 < z < z, where z is some
exogenous value. We label these inputs as intermediates. The second phase is modeled as a
decrease in trade costs associated with middle-skill-intensive inputs, z > z, which we denote
as tasks. During both phases, we assume that marginal decreases in trade costs happen for
inputs that are relatively more skill intensive. This implies that the skill content of trade
is increasing in both globalizations, which is consistent with Figures 3a and 3b. They show
that the skill content of trade flows below (above) the average skill content increases during
the L(C)-globalization.
Section 4 presents the main results. In the L-globalization, the set of low-skill-intensive
intermediates imported from the South increases. As in Wood (1995) and Feenstra and
Hanson (1996), since the skill requirement of the intermediates imported by the North
is below its mean skill intensity, the relative demand for middle-skill workers increases,
thereby raising their relative wage. Moreover, the wage of high-skill workers relative to
both middle- and low-skill agents increases because more intermediates can be bought at
cheaper prices and demand for northern intermediates decreases. In the C-globalization, the
set of traded tasks increases. The relative wage of high-skill workers increases for the same
reasons as in the L-globalization. The relative wage of middle- to low-skill workers exhibits
a hump-shaped pattern. The reason is that the relative demand of northern middle-skill
workers declines only when the marginal task being offshored to the South is above the skill
intensity of the average input produced in the North after the first phase of globalization.
Thus, the equilibrium tends to wage polarization in the North.
We find a complementarity between trade in the two globalizations. Wage polarization
is delayed by the extent of trade in the L-globalization. A larger set of traded low-skill-
intensive intermediates implies a higher skill intensity of the average input produced in
the North. Thus, more trade in intermediates allows a larger set of tasks to be offshored
during the C-globalization before the relative wage of northern middle-skill workers starts
to decline. We provide empirical evidence consistent with this prediction. We find a positive
relationship between trade openness before the onset of the IT revolution and changes in
lower-tail northern wage inequality in the 1990s.
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In the South, relative wages increase in the two globalizations. The intuition is analo-
gous to Wood (1995) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996): the marginal input being offshored
is relatively more skill-intensive, which raises the relative demand of middle-skill labor and
the relative wage throughout the globalization process.
Subsection 4.2 introduces a second southern country to study how asymmetric partici-
pation in the IT-driven trade affects the pattern of specialization and wage inequality in the
South.We assume that only one southern country can participate in the C-globalization. In
equilibrium, this country exports tasks to the North and the relative wage of low-skill work-
ers in this country decreases. Thus, this country gains comparative advantage in the least
skill-intensive intermediates, which generates a discontinuous pattern of specialization. The
most and least skill-intensive traded inputs are produced by this southern country. As the
second phase of globalization progresses, the equilibrium tends to complete specialization.
One South produces tasks and the other, intermediates. The relative wage of middle-skill
workers increases in the South participating in the C-globalization, while it declines in the
other. We provide evidence for the changes in the pattern of specialization amongst south-
ern countries consistent with the predictions of our model. We show that southern countries
with a high stock of IT technologies tend to increase exports in industries with levels of
RTI above average (which are middle-skill-intensive), and decrease exports in industries
with skill intensity below-average.
Section 5 relaxes the assumption on the exogenous supply of labor. Since we are con-
sidering labor demand shocks during a long period of time, we allow for endogenous supply
decisions. We show that the comparative statics for wages derived in the baseline model
hold in this extended version. Moreover, we find that the mass of northern agents selecting
into middle-skill jobs increases during the L-globalization and eventually shrinks during the
C-globalization. This is consistent with the empirical evidence on job polarization in the
North, see for example Autor et al. (2008). Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence and Related Literature
In this section we present evidence that points towards two phases of globalization charac-
terized by changes in trade costs affecting industries of different skill-intensity. Motivated
by this evidence, our paper focuses on the effects of heterogeneous changes in trade costs on
wage inequality and the pattern of specialization. To the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first attempt to provide a unified view of the globalization process and its effect on
wage inequality, both across North-South trade and between different southern countries.
2.1 Motivating Evidence
The premise of our analysis is that trade costs have changed differentially across sectors of
different skill intensity over time. The overall evidence in this section paints a picture of two
different phases of globalization: an L-globalization, driven by trade liberalizations which
increased trade in low-skill-intensive industries and affected the relative demand of low-
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skill workers; and a C-globalization characterized by a fall in communication costs, which
raised trade in intermediate skill-intensive industries and affected the relative demand of
middle-skill workers. Finally, we show that the skill content of southern exports increased
in below-average skill-intensive industries during the L-globalization and in above-average
skill-intensive industries during the C-globalization.
We present our findings in three steps. First, we document heterogeneous changes in
trade costs across skill and over time. Second, we relate these changes to trade flows and
the relative demand of skill. Third, we report the evolution of the skill content of southern
exports in industries with skill requirement below and above the U.S. average.
The first piece of evidence on heterogeneous changes in trade costs comes from analyzing
changes in U.S. tariffs and transportation costs over time. Our data is disaggregated at
3-digit NAICS and we use educational attainment of workers in an industry from the U.S.
census as proxy for industry skill intensity. First, we find that tariff reductions between
1978 and 1988 were concentrated in low-skill industries (Figure 4a). This result is similar
to Haskel and Slaughter (2003), who use non-production workers to proxy for skill. Second,
we show that changes in U.S. tariffs were not significantly different from zero at any level of
skill intensity during the 1990s (Figure 4b). Third, we show that changes in transportation
costs were not statistically different from zero at any level of skill, neither in the 1980s,
nor in the 1990s (Figure 5). This evidence is consistent with Hummels (2007) findings
for the ad-valorem shipping cost not having changed much since the 1950s. There is a
growing literature emphasizing that there are more dimensions in trade costs than tariffs
and transportation costs, e.g., Hummels (2007). However, data along other dimensions
of trade costs are difficult to obtain, specially for non-tariff barriers (Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2004) and we abstract from them.
Our second piece of evidence on heterogeneous changes in trade costs aims at capturing
some of the effects of the IT revolution. During the 1990s, new jobs such as telephone op-
erators or data entry keyers started to be offshored (Trefler, 2006). The standard measures
of trade costs are less relevant for this new trade pattern. A common characteristic of these
new tasks being offshored is that they are standardized and follow tight and determined
procedures. In order to capture this feature, we use the Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index
from Autor and Dorn (2009) as a proxy for “offshorability.” The argument is that a reduc-
tion in communication costs (IT revolution) makes jobs with high RTI index more likely to
be offshored.6 Oldenski (2011) and Crino` (2010) provide empirical evidence consistent with
this argument, showing that routine tasks are more likely to be offshored.7 Figure 6 reports
anecdotal evidence pointing that higher RTI jobs are performed by middle-skill workers. It
suggests that there exists an inverse U-shape relationship between skill intensity and RTI,
6Each job is assigned a routine and a manual score, and this index is the log ratio of the two. Therefore,
tasks with high RTI imply a high routine and a low manual score. The RTI index assigns a value of “routine
intensity” to a representative set of 332 occupations in the U.S. census. See Autor and Dorn (2009) for
further details. Note that the findings reported in Blinder and Krueger (2009) are not inconsistent with
the use of the RTI index as proxy for offshorability. The reason is that Blinder and Krueger only consider
a measure of routine that abstracts from the manual content of a job.
7Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Ebenstein et al. (2011) also relate routine indices with offshoring.
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which we find when aggregating at the industry level (Figure 7).8
Next, we investigate how trade flows relate to changes in the trade costs described
above. More specifically, we analyze the relationship between U.S. imports and tariffs and
communication costs for different levels of industry skill-intensity. We use Internet adoption
at country level as a proxy for communication costs. The reason is that goods that become
offshorable can be electronically delivered (e.g., data entry keyers) or require intense usage
of IT (e.g., call centers). We run the following regression for 1990 and 2000,
Xic = α+ β τ i + γ Internetc · Skill Intensityj + δj + δc + εic, (1)
where Xic are exports of product i from country c to the United States, τ i is U.S. tariff
on product i, Internetc is the fraction of the population with access to Internet in country
c, Skill Intensityj is the average skill of industry j and δj and δc represent industry and
country fixed effects, respectively.9
Column 1 of panel A in Table 1 shows a negative, significant correlation between tariffs
and U.S. imports in 1990. This correlation is larger when the sample is restricted to
southern countries (column 4). Panel B reports not significant coefficients on tariffs for year
2000. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction between Internet and Skill Intensity is
positive and significant when restricting the sample to the South (column 5), pointing at a
differential effect of the IT revolution on poor countries.10 Note that our results abstract
from trade in services, because these data are not available. We think this lack of data
on services underestimates our results because offshored services are RTI intensive and, as
argued by Markusen (2006) and Markusen and Strand (2008), require above-average skills
to be produced.
We investigate how the relative demand for skill relates to trade flows over time. We
report how changes in the wage bill paid by different U.S. industries are correlated with
changes in U.S. trade. Column 1 in Table 2 reports the results of regressing the change
in U.S. wage bill during the 1980s on the interaction of average industry skill with the
change in trade openness.11 The coefficient is positive and significant. Column 2 shows
8The maximum in RTI intensity corresponds to industries with an average worker reporting “Some
College, No degree” educational level.
9U.S. imports are from Feenstra’s data base and U.S. tariffs come from Romalis. Romalis’ tariff data
starts in 1989, thus we can only test for the last years of our Fist Globalization. Our measure of industry is
a 3-digit NAICS and of product is a 6-digit HS. There are no data for Internet adoption in 1990 (presumably
it was negligible for most of the sample).
10In this sample the highest skill intensity level is 11.4, which roughly coincides with skill level associated
with the largest RTI. As robustness checks we added additional controls. One could think that our Internet
adoption measure could be a proxy for other country variables such as country wealth, human capital
levels and financial development and therefore their interaction with skill intensity could be relevant. Our
coefficients of interest remained significant and with similar values to the baseline regression when adding
these additional covariates. A second robustness check is to control for the potential endogeneity of our
measure of skill intensity. In order to address this concern, we instrument skill intensity with the RTI index.
Our exclusion restriction is that RTI only affects exports through the level of skill intensity of an industry.
Columns 3 and 6 report the previous regressions using this instrumental variable approach. The coefficients
of interest remain significant and with the expected sign.
11We use the U.S. wage bill data for 1980-1996 constructed in Autor et al. (1998). Our trade openness
measure is the share of exports plus imports over GDP from the Penn World Tables.
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that the coefficient on the interaction term is not significant for the 1990s. Yet, when we
add a quadratic term, the coefficients become significant, as shown in column 3. These
regression coefficients imply a U-shape pattern for the response of wage bill to increases in
trade. These results suggest that the relationship between trade and demand for skill has
changed over time.
Finally, Figure 3a and 3b report the skill content of southern exports in industries with
skill requirement below and above the U.S. average, respectively. These figures point to an
increase in the skill content of southern exports in below-average skill-intensity during the
L-globalization and above-average skill-intensity in the C-globalization. This suggestive
evidence will motivate our comparative statics exercises in Section 4.12
2.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to a rich and diverse literature on international trade, wage inequality
and the patterns of specialization. Our L-globalization comparative statics results are
related to standard Heckscher-Ohlin models and the work of Wood (1995) and Feenstra
and Hanson (1996). Feenstra and Hanson provide a rationale for increasing inequality in
both the North and the South. They analyze the effect of capital inflows to the South
in the context of a free trade equilibrium. These capital inflows reduce the unit cost of
production in the South, allowing the South to produce more (relatively) skill-intensive
goods at the margin. The mechanics of our comparative statics for the L-globalization is
similar. However, their comparative statics exercise is different from ours, as we focus on
changes in trade costs. Another important difference is that our framework, by assuming
heterogeneous trade costs, allows us to study the two waves of globalization and their
interdependence.
Our analysis of the C-globalization bears upon the literature on offshoring, outsourcing
and wage inequality. It includes, among others, Antra`s et al. (2006a,b), Dinopoulos et al.
(2009), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Markusen and Strand (2008) and Zhu and
Trefler (2005). Our paper shares the emphasis on middle-skill agents as in Antra`s et al.
(2006b). They focus on team problem solving. In contrast, we consider a segmented
production process with firms supplying inputs, which enables us to distinguish the effects
of different changes in trade costs on wage inequality. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)
consider the effect of heterogeneous transportation costs. However, they assume that tasks
can be so perfectly partitioned that a fall in trade costs only affects one type of labor.
Anderson (2009), Costinot and Vogel (2010), Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Ohnsorge
and Trefler (2007) among others study the role of sorting for wage inequality and the pattern
of specialization. They emphasize the difference between North-South and North-North
trade, from which we abstract. However, they ignore the differential effect of heterogeneous
changes in trade costs across sectors of different skill-intensity.
12To perform this exercise we hold the skill requirement of an industry fixed at the level of the United
States. Then we compute the weighted average of the skill embodied in southern exports. Both figures use
non-production workers data from BLS. These findings are robust to consider only U.S. or G-7 imports.
We find similar qualitative results when we use the skill-intensity index constructed from U.S. census data.
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Finally, a new series of recent papers document heterogeneous effects of offshoring on
wage inequality by skills, which are consistent with the assumptions and predictions of
our model. Ebenstein et al. (2011) document sizable within-occupation changes in U.S.
wages related to North-South trade. They show that workers experiencing higher wage
declines are those in RTI-intensive occupations and those without higher education (and
old workers). These negative effects are only significant in the later periods of their sample,
1992-2002, and not during the 1980s. Hummels et al. (2011), by analyzing Danish data from
1995-2006, show that offshoring tends to increase the wage of those with tertiary education
and decrease it for the others. Moreover, they find that workers whose occupations involve
routine tasks suffer larger wage falls. On a similar vein, Oldenski (2012) finds that U.S.
multinationals tend to offshore routine-intensive jobs. Other papers report heterogeneous
effects of offshoring across skill levels and routinization. These include Crino` (2010), Autor
et al. (2011) and Liu and Trefler (2011).13
3 Model
In this section we present a simple model to study the effects of the two phases of globa-
lization. A freely traded final good is produced in the North using high-skill labor and a
bundle of inputs, which are produced by middle- and low-skill workers. Inputs are subject
to heterogeneous trade costs, which enable us to frame our two globalizations in a tractable
manner. Section 4 derives the main results of the paper performing comparative statics on
trade costs. The baseline model abstracts from endogenous labor supply decisions. Section
5 shows that the results derived for the baseline case hold when there is a continuum of
types and each type endogenously selects into one occupation.
3.1 Baseline Model
We consider a competitive world economy consisting of two countries, the North, N, and
the South, S. Each country is populated by a mass one of agents, which cannot migrate.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor that inelastically supplies to the market.
Northern agents can be divided between low-, middle- and high-skill types. The fraction of
each type is 1− θN , θN (1−ϕ) and θNϕ, respectively. Our interpretation is that a fraction
θN has basic education and a fraction ϕ obtains further education. We assume that ϕ = 0
in the South. Thus, southern population can be divided between a fraction 1 − θS of low
and a fraction θS of middle-skill agents. Finally, we assume that the South is relatively
abundant in low-skill labor, i.e., (1− θS)/θS > (1− θN )/θN (1− ϕ).
All agents have the same utility function, u(c), where c is final good consumption. The
13Labor economists have documented large changes in wage inequality (mostly for the U.S.), which our
findings relate to. This vast literature includes Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu (1999), Autor et al.
(2003), Autor et al. (2008), Goos and Manning (2007) and Autor and Dorn (2009) among others.
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final good is produced by combining a bundle of inputs B and high-skill services h,
Y = hαB1−α, α ∈ (0, 1). (2)
h can be thought of as headquarter services, which are provided by high-skill agents. The
bundle is made by assembling a continuum of inputs, I(z), with z ∈ [0, 1],14
B = exp
[∫ 1
0
ln I(z)dz
]
. (3)
Each input is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function
I(z) =
(
m(z)
z
)z ( l(z)
1− z
)1−z
for each z ∈ [0, 1], (4)
where m(z) and l(z) denote middle- and low-skill workers employed in the production of
input z, respectively. Note that z parametrizes the skill-intensity required to produce each
input. The higher z is, the more middle-skill-intensive the input is.
The final good is assumed to be freely traded and we normalize its price to one through-
out the paper. Inputs are subject to heterogeneous iceberg costs. For one unit of input z
to arrive at home, τ(z) ≥ 1 units must be purchased abroad.15
3.2 Trade Equilibrium
The problem of the final good producer is
max
{h,Ii(z)}z∈[0,1]
hα
(
exp
[∫ 1
0
ln I i(z)dz
])1−α
− whh−
∫ 1
0
pi(z)Ii(z)dz, (5)
which implies that the demand for high-skill services and each input z are
αY = whh, (6)
(1− α)Y = pi(z)Ii(z). (7)
Consider the problem of an input producer in country i,
max
{mi(z),hi(z)}z∈[0,1]
pi(z)
(
mi(z)
z
)z (
li(z)
1− z
)1−z
− wimm
i(z)− wil l
i(z).
14The aggregation of inputs in a bundle is similar to the production function in Dixit and Grossman
(1982).
15The assumption that the final good is traded at no cost is not crucial for our results. Our comparative
statics results rely on heterogeneous changes in trade costs of middle- and low-skill industries. Changes in
trade cost of the final good do not affect relative demand of middle- and low-skill workers because of the
homotheticity of the final good production function. In the on-line Appendix we analyze two similar models
with three types in both North and South and derive qualitatively analogous results. In these versions,
both North and South high-skill workers produce final good.
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The labor demands of a producer of input z in country i are given by
zpi(z)Ii(z) = wimm
i(z), (8)
(1− z)pi(z)Ii(z) = wil l
i(z). (9)
The labor market clearing conditions are obtained by integrating labor demands across
all input producers in each country
wh = α
Y
θNϕ
, (10)
∫ 1
0
mN (z)dz = (1− α)Y
∫ 1
0
(
1
N
d (z) +
1
N
x (z)
τ(z)
)
z
wNm
dz = θN (1− ϕ), (11)∫ 1
0
lN (z)dz = (1− α)Y
∫ 1
0
(
1
N
d (z) +
1
N
x (z)
τ(z)
)
(1− z)
wNl
dz = 1− θN , (12)
∫ 1
0
mS(z)dz = (1− α)Y
∫ 1
0
1
S
x (z)
τ(z)
z
wSm
dz = θS , (13)∫ 1
0
lS(z)dz = (1− α)Y
∫ 1
0
1
S
x (z)
τ(z)
(1− z)
wSl
dz = 1− θS , (14)
where 1id(z) and 1
i
x(z) are indicator functions for each input z being produced in country
i for domestic consumption and for exporting, respectively.
Definition A competitive equilibrium for a given trade cost structure τ(z) is a set of prices
pi(z) for each input z and country i ∈ {N,S}, a price for the final good pf (≡ 1), a wage
for low-skill workers wil , a wage for middle-skill workers w
i
m, a wage for northern high-
skill workers wNh , an allocation of low-skill l
i(z) and middle-skill mi(z) labor across inputs
producers and a consumption choice ci for each agent in country i such that: relative wages
follow from factor demands and market clearing conditions, equations (10) to (14), pi(z)
follows from the demand function (7), the allocations of middle- and low-skill labor, mi(z)
and li(z), is consistent with profit maximization, (8) and (9), and consumption is equal to
income.
4 Main Results
In this section we present the two main results of the paper. Subsection 4.1 derives the dis-
tributional consequences of the L- and the C-globalizations and shows the complementarity
between the two. Subsection 4.2 extends the baseline model by dividing the original South
in two different southern countries which open differently to trade in the C-globalization.
Our second main result establishes how the patterns of specialization and wage inequality
depend on the differential participation in the C-globalization.
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4.1 The Two Globalizations and their Complementarity
This section performs comparative statics for the two globalizations on relative wages.
Then, we present our first main result (complementarity), which shows that trade in
the L-globalization delays the emergence of wage polarization in the North during the
C-globalization.
4.1.1 The L-globalization
Section 2 characterized the L-globalization as a decrease in trade costs of the least skill-
intensive inputs. To study its effects in a parsimonious way, we assume that trade is only
possible in inputs with an index lower than zI . In other words, trade costs are
τ(z) =

1 for z ≤ zI ,∞ otherwise. (15)
We formally define L-globalization as an increase in the set of traded intermediates,
zI .
16 This implies that the skill requirement of the marginal traded intermediate increases
with globalization, which is consistent with the fact documented in Figure 3a.17 Therefore,
the comparative statics exercise we are interested in is an increase in zI .
Assumption 1 zI < z
∗(θN , θS) < 1 , where z
∗(θN , θS) is implicitly defined as
(
1− z∗
2
z∗2
θS
θN
)z∗ (
(1− z∗)2
1− (1− z∗)2
1− θS
1− θN
)1−z∗
= 1. (16)
This assumption implies that all traded inputs are produced in the South. It can be
interpreted in economic terms as follows. Given that the cost of input production is a
combination (geometric mean) of the wage of low- and middle-skill workers, we require
that the relative endowments are such that the comparative advantage of the South in
using low-skill workers is stronger than the comparative advantage of the North in middle-
skill workers, so that all traded inputs are cheaper in the South. The North exports the
final good to ensure trade balance.
Proposition 1 (L-globalization) The L-globalization features an increase of the relative
wage of middle- to low-skill workers in both North and South. The relative wage of northern
high-skill workers increases.
16The threshold zI can be endogenized as an equilibrium outcome in a model with constant iceberg costs
τ(z) = τ on intermediates. The reason is that the South has comparative advantage in low-skill-intensive
inputs. In this case, our L-globalization comparative statics exercise (i.e., an increase in zI ) could be
endogenously obtained as a decrease in τ .
17Our qualitative results would hold if we allowed for τ(z) = 1 for z ∈ [z, zI ], with z > 0. The key
assumption is that an increase in the set of traded inputs in the L-Globalization translates into an increase
in the relative demand of middle-skill labor in the South.
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The proof follows from using equations (10) to (14) and the trade cost structure (15).
The relative wages of northern high-skill workers are
wNh
wNm
=
α
1− α
1− ϕ
ϕ
2
1− z2
I
,
wNh
wNl
=
α
1− α
1− θN
θNϕ
2
(1− zI )2
,
They are increasing in zI because more intermediates can be bought at cheaper prices for
final good production and demand for northern intermediates decreases. The relative wages
of middle- to low-skill workers are
wNm
wNl
=
1− θN
θNϕ
1 + zI
1− zI
,
wSm
wSl
=
1− θS
θS
z2
I
1− (1− zI )2
.
By inspection, the relative wages are increasing in zI . Note that the relative wages consist
of two parts. The first term, containing θi, corresponds to the relative supply (of low-
skill agents), while the second term, containing zI , corresponds to the relative demand.
Therefore, our L-globalization comparative statics represents a shift in the relative demand
curves, while keeping the relative supply fixed.
The relative wage of middle- to low-skill workers in the North increases because it
offshores the least skill-intensive inputs. As a result, the relative demand of middle-skill
workers increases, thereby increasing the relative wage.18 The relative wage of middle-
to low-skill workers also increases in the South. The reason is that an increase in traded
intermediates (i.e., an increase in zI ) translates into a larger relative demand of middle-skill
jobs. This result is similar to Wood (1995) or Feenstra and Hanson (1996).19
4.1.2 The C-globalization and the Complementarity Result
Based on our results in Section 2, we characterize the C-globalization as an increase in
traded middle-skill-intensive inputs. We argued that the reduction in communication costs
was the driver of the C-globalization and it mainly affected trade in middle-skill-intensive
industries. Thus, we add to the set of traded intermediates a new set of tradeable tasks.
Given that the nature of the trade costs driving the two globalizations is different, it is
natural to allow for the two sets to be possibly disjoint. We frame this observation in the
following trade cost structure
τ(z) =

1 for z ≤ zI and z¯ ≤ z ≤ zII ,∞ otherwise, (17)
where 0 ≤ zI ≤ z¯ ≤ zII < 1. This means that, in addition to the L-globalization trade in
intermediates z ∈ [0, zI ], we now allow for trade in more skill-intensive tasks z ∈ [z¯, zII ].
18In fact, we find that real wages of northern low- and middle-skill workers fall during the L-globalization.
This is consistent with the U.S. wage data, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992). As pointed out by Acemoglu
and Autor (2012), the canonical model of skill-biased technological change cannot deliver this prediction.
19There is mixed evidence on the effects of trade on inequality in the South, e.g., Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2007).
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We formally define the C-globalization as an increase in zII , which is consistent with the
evidence presented in Figure 3b. Thus, the comparative statics exercise that we perform is
to increase the set of traded inputs with skill intensity above z¯ by increasing zII .
Allowing for the sets of traded inputs in the two globalizations to be disjoint enables
us to have a natural measure of depth of the L-globalization. Other formulations that do
not rely on disjoint sets are possible and deliver similar insights. The two key assumptions
are (i) trade during the C-globalization affects more skill-intensive industries than during
the L-globalization and (ii) the set of inputs that can be traded increases by incorporating
inputs that are relatively more skill-intensive. These two assumptions are borne out by the
data, as discussed above.
Assumption 2 zII < z
∗(θN , θS) , where z
∗(θN , θS) is implicitly defined in equation (16).
Assumption 2 ensures that in equilibrium the South produces all traded inputs.
Proposition 2 (C-globalization) During the C-globalization, the relative wage of middle-
to low-skill workers in the North has an inverse U-shape pattern. It increases in zII for
zII < z˜II (zI , z¯) and decreases thereafter. The relative wage of high-skill workers in the North
and the relative wage of middle- to low-skill workers in the South increase in zII .
20
The intuition for the comparative statics of the relative wage of middle-skill workers in
the North is as follows. Suppose that z¯ = 1/2. To a first order approximation (for small
zI ), the threshold z˜II (zI , z¯ = 1/2) is the arithmetic mean of the skill intensity of inputs
produced in the North after the L-globalization, i.e., z˜II (zI ) =
1+zI
2 . Therefore, when
the North offshores tasks with a skill requirement below the skill intensity of the average
input produced domestically, the relative demand of middle-skill workers increases, raising
the relative wage. Conversely, the relative wage decreases when the tasks being offshored
require a skill intensity higher than the skill requirement of the average input. The relative
wage of high-skill workers increases because the bundle of imported inputs increases, while
demand for northern middle- and low-skill workers declines. These results imply that the
equilibrium tends to wage polarization: the relative wage of high- to middle-skill workers
increases and the relative wage of middle- to low-skill workers eventually decreases. The
relative wage in the South increases in the C-globalization. The reason is that the marginal
input being offshored is more skill-intensive, which raises the relative demand of middle-skill
workers.
Our results for the evolution of the wage distribution in the North are consistent with
the 90/50 and 50/10 measures of U.S. wage inequality in the last three decades, documented
in Autor et al. (2008). Namely, the 90/50 measure has steadily increased, and the 50/10
increased during the 1980s, flattening and, eventually declining thereafter.
Proposition 3 (Complementarity in the North) The threshold z˜II (zI , z¯) is increasing in
zI .
20All remaining proofs can be found in Appendix A.
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Proposition 3 shows that the threshold below which the relative wage of northern middle-
to low-skill workers rises, z˜II , increases with the extent of L-globalization, zII . Figure 8
provides a graphical representation of this result. Consider the extreme case in which the
L-globalization did not happen, i.e., zI = 0. The mean skill intensity of northern inputs is
z˜II = 1/2. Thus, if we keep the assumption that z¯ = 1/2, the relative wage decreases from
the onset of the C-globalization. Consider now the case in which there has been some L-
globalization, i.e., zI > 0. In this case, the mean skill is larger (z˜II (zI ) > 1/2), implying that
the relative wage increases in the first stages of the C-globalization (zII < z˜II ), to decrease
thereafter. This interdependence brings about the importance of taking into account the
L-globalization to predict the effects of the C-globalization. There is a complementarity
between trade in the two globalizations: northern wage polarization is delayed by the extent
of trade in the L-globalization.
We provide suggestive evidence consistent with the complementarity result. Proposition
3 states that the deeper the L-globalization is, the more the relative wage of middle- to low-
skill workers (our 50/10 measure) rises. Table 3 reports the results of regressing changes
in northern 50/10 wage inequality on trade openness.21 The coefficient on trade openness
is positive and significant (column 1), consistent with the complementarity result. This
finding remains when controlling for income per capita (column 2) or restricting the sample
to G-7 countries (column 3), obtaining very similar regression coefficients. Restricting
the sample to G-7 countries and controlling for income per capita, yields a very similar
coefficient on trade openness, although the coefficient is no longer significant at a 5% level.
Even though a quantitative assessment of the results presented in this section is beyond
the scope of the paper, recent studies by Hummels et al. (2011) and by Ebenstein et al.
(2011) find the effects of offshoring to be empirically relevant and heterogeneous across skill
and “routine-intensiveness” in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model. For
example, Hummels et al. (2011) find a wage-elasticity with respect to offshoring of around
3.3% and -1.75% for agents with and without tertiary education, respectively. Ebenstein
et al. (2011) find that “. . . for workers who are in occupations with the most routine content
(. . . ), a one percent increase in offshoring to low-income countries is associated with a 0.20
percent decrease in wages. . . .” Finally, the estimates that we obtain from our complemen-
tarity result suggest a sizable effect of the complementarity between the two globalizations:
a one percent increase in L-globalization trade, increases .2 points the relative wage of
middle- to low-skill. Taken at face value, our regression explains around 30% percent of
the variation in the changes in wage inequality in the 1990s.
4.2 Two Souths and the Moving Band
In this subsection, we investigate how the existence of different southern countries which
asymmetrically participate in the C-globalization affects their pattern of specialization and
wage inequality. As pointed out before, a key difference between the two globalizations
21Trade openness is computed as exports plus imports of the Northern countries to and from the South
over GDP.
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is that, while the L-globalization is driven by trade liberalizations, the C-globalization is
driven by the fall in communication costs. Arguably, a trade liberalization is a policy
relatively easier to implement than building the specific capital needed to benefit from the
IT revolution.Thus, it is reasonable to expect that not all southern countries can equally
participate in the C-globalization. To account for this heterogeneity within our framework,
we consider an extension in which two identical Souths, Southeast and Southwest, open
asymmetrically to trade during the C-globalization. More specifically, we assume that the
two Souths open to trade in the L-globalization, but only Southeast participates in the
C-globalization.22
The equilibrium in the L-globalization is simple. Due to the symmetry of the two south-
ern countries, all competitive equilibria feature the same wage schedule in both Souths. Ap-
pendix A contains the formal proof. We now turn to the characterization of the equilibrium
in the C-globalization.
Proposition 4 (Pattern of Specialization) In the C-globalization, Southeast exports tasks
z ∈ [z, zII ] and intermediates z ≤ zˇI (zI , zII ). Southwest exports intermediates z ∈ [zˇI (zI , zII ), zI ],
with 0 ≤ zˇI (zI , zII ) < zI .
The reason for this result is that when Southeast starts offshoring tasks, its relative wage
of low-skill workers decreases (these tasks are more skill-intensive than the intermediates
offshored during the L-globalization). This gives Southeast comparative advantage in the
least skill-intensive intermediates. As a result, in addition to tasks (z ∈ [z, zII ]), Southeast
also produces the least skill-intensive intermediates (z ∈ [0, zˇI ]).
Proposition 5 (Moving Band) The threshold zˇI (zI , zII ) is increasing in zI and decreasing
in zII in the relevant range.
An implication of Proposition 5 is that the equilibrium tends to complete specialization
as the C-globalization progresses (i.e., zII increases). As the set of traded tasks increases,
the labor demand in Southeast increases, raising wages. Thus, the range of intermediates
in which Southwest has comparative advantage increases. Wages in Southeast rise and
eventually reach a point in which Southeast is only able to produce tasks (i.e., zˇI goes
to zero). Therefore, the band of intermediates produced in Southeast shrinks with the
progress of the C-globalization. In this sense, we have a moving band of intermediates in
which Southeast has comparative advantage.
In 2000, Internet access in India was twice as large as in Pakistan. If we take Internet
access as a proxy for IT usage, this difference suggests an asymmetric participation in the
C-globalization for India and Pakistan.23 Our model predicts India specializing in middle-
skill-intensive industries and Pakistan specializing in less skill-intensive industries. Figure
22We maintain Assumption 2.
23We use the number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants and the International Internet Bandwidth
measured in bits per person from the World Development Indicators (World Bank). The relative supply of
skills between India and Pakistan was similar in 1990 when compared to other developing countries. For
example, according to the Barro-Lee data set, the fraction of agents with secondary education was 25% in
India and 19% in Pakistan, for a 39% in Malaysia or a 34% in the Philippines.
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9 shows that Indian and Pakistani exports to the United States are consistent with this
prediction. India increased exports in industries above the average skill requirement, and
decreased exports in industries below. We analyze whether these results extend to a larger
set of countries and run the following regression
∆Xiz = β∆InternetiδC(z) + γ∆InternetiδL(z) + iz,
where ∆Xiz denotes changes in exports from a southern country i to the United States in
industry z between 2000 and 1990, ∆Interneti is Internet adoption in country i in 2000,
δC(z) is an indicator for industry z participating in the C-globalization and δL(z) is an
indicator for L-globalization industries.24 The prediction of our model is that as a southern
country participates more in the C-globalization, it increases its exports in C-globalization
goods, β > 0, and reduces its exports in L-globalization goods, γ < 0.
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the coefficients of our baseline regression. The interaction
between Internet adoption and C-globalization industries is positive and significant and
the interaction between Internet adoption and L-globalization industries is negative and
also significant. In column 2 we reduce the number of industries participating in the C-
globalization by raising the RTI threshold from the 50th to the 66th percentile. The sign
and significance of the coefficients remain the same. Therefore, the evidence presented in
Table 4 is consistent with the prediction of the model.
Next, we characterize the behavior of relative wages.
Proposition 6 The relative wage of middle-skill workers is increasing in Southeast and
(weakly) decreasing in Southwest in zII .
The intuition for this result is similar to Proposition 2. Southwest increases the produc-
tion of intermediates below the mean skill of its domestic production, raising the relative
wage of low-skill workers. The converse happens with Southeast. The set of exported tasks
increases, while the band of exported intermediates decreases. As a result, the relative
demand for middle-skill labor rises, thereby increasing its relative wage.
Proposition 6 highlights how gains from the C-globalization may not be equally shared
between different types of workers across southern countries or, if we assume low labor
mobility within countries, our model can be applied to different regions of the same country.
In fact, some studies suggest that there is low labor mobility within southern countries.
For example, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) document low labor mobility in rural India,
even though inequality has risen in recent years.25 Then, this model could explain why
24There are no data for Internet adoption in 1990 and it was presumably negligible for most of sample.
δL(z) = (1− δC(z))∗ δlow(z), where δlow(z) is a dummy for industry z taking value of one for industries below
the average skill requirement. δC(z) is a dummy taking value of one for industry z with the RTI index above
the 50th and 66th percentile of the distribution in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Note that high levels
of RTI are associated with middle-skill-intensive industries. The results we find (significant δ and γ with
the expected sign) are robust to adding as controls changes in income per capita and changes in access to
domestic credit.
25Paweenawat and Townsend (2009) document a similar pattern for Thailand and show that wages are
not equalized across different Thai regions. Candelaria et al. (2009) document a similar fact for China:
16
inequality has increased in Bengaluru, an Indian city specialized in C-globalization exports,
and declined in Bhopa, a city which has not benefited from C-globalization trade.
This section provided a tractable framework to study how differential access to trade
generates changes in the pattern of specialization and wage inequality in otherwise identical
southern countries. In our model, we assumed that the source of differential access to
trade comes from the necessity of building an IT specific capital to benefit from the C-
globalization. We think of this infrastructure as being inherently more difficult to create and
manage than tariff reductions. Therefore, our globalization approach provides a rationale
for asymmetric participation within southern countries. This asymmetric participation
generates a discontinuous pattern of specialization for the country (or region) participating
in the C-globalization. It leads to increasing wage inequality in this country (or region),
while reducing it in the one not participating.
5 A Model with Endogenous Labor Supply
In our baseline model we assumed that labor supply is exogenous. Therefore, we assumed
that workers could not react to changes in the relative demand of skill. It could be argued
that our assumption holds for unexpected labor demand shocks in the short-run but it
becomes less realistic when considering longer periods of time. In order to address this
concern, in this section we endogenize labor supply.
We extend the baseline model to allow agents to self-select in any of the occupations of
the economy. Let j be the index of an agent. We assume that j ∈ [0, 1]. If agent j chooses
to be employed in a low-, middle- or high-skill job, this agent can supply one, si(j) and
si(j)1+ε units of labor in country i, respectively. ε is some small number greater than zero.
Note that wages described in Section 3 should now be interpreted as wages per unit of
effective labor. To avoid a taxonomical analysis, we assume that functions si(j) are strictly
increasing.
North and South only differ on si(j), where sN (j) first order stochastically dominates
sS(j).26 Note that there is a single-crossing property built in si. If an agent j with skill
si(j) chooses to be employed as a high-skill worker, another agent j′, with j < j′ will also
work as high-skill worker. Therefore, there exists a cutoff level of skill s¯i, such that all
agents with si > s¯i choose to work as high-skill workers. A similar reasoning applies for
the middle to low decision.
The agent j¯i in country i who is indifferent between being employed in a middle- or
low-skill job satisfies the condition si(j¯)wim = w
i
l . Similarly, the agent J¯ who is indifferent
between being employed in a high- or middle-skill job in the North verifies sN (J¯)εwNh = w
N
m.
It is convenient to choose a functional form for sN (j) to obtain analytic solutions. For
tractability, we specialize sN (j) = j in what follows.
inequality in coastal regions has increased, while it has remained fairly constant in inland regions.
26Formally, this is
∫
J
0
sN (j)dj
∫
1
0
sN (j)dj
≤
∫
J
0
sS(j)dj
∫
1
0
sS(j)dj
∀J ∈ [0, 1].
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Proposition 7 (L-globalization) During the L-globalization the mass of agents selecting
into middle- and high-skill jobs increases with zI in the North. The relative wage of middle-
to low-skill workers and the relative wage of high-skill workers in the North increase with
zI . In the South, the mass of middle-skill workers and its relative wage increase with zI .
The intuition for the results in Proposition 7 is that an increase in the set of tradeable
intermediates increases the relative demand of middle-skill workers in both North and
South. Therefore, the mass of agents selecting into middle-skill jobs increases in both
countries. However, these changes in the supply of skills do not offset the primary demand
forces, and the comparative statics for relative wages is analogous to section 4. The return
on high-skill labor increases with trade because it increases the set of intermediates that
can be purchased in the South at a cheaper price, while the demand for low and middle-skill
workers declines in the North.
Proposition 8 (C-globalization) During the C-globalization the equilibrium exhibits the
following features. The mass of northern middle-skill workers increases for zII < z˜II (zI , z¯)
and decreases thereafter, where z˜II (zI , z¯) is defined in Proposition 2. The mass of high-skill
workers increases with zII . The mass of low-skill workers decreases for zII < z˜II (zI , z¯) +
η(zI , z¯), with η > 0 and increases thereafter. The relative wage of high-skill workers in-
creases with zII and the relative wage of middle- to low-skill workers increases for zII <
z˜II (zI , z¯) + η(zI , z¯) and decreases thereafter. In the South, the mass of middle-skill workers
and its relative wage increase with zII .
An implication of Proposition 8 is that wage polarization emerges during the C-globalization.
Compared to the exogenous labor supply case, wage polarization is delayed when agents
can endogenously select into occupations. This delay is intuitive because in the endoge-
nous supply case there is an extra margin of adjustment. An additional insight from this
exercise is to show the endogenous responses of the masses of agents selecting into each
occupation. Consistent with the labor literature (e.g., Autor and Dorn, 2009), the mass
of middle-skill workers in the North eventually shrinks and the mass of agents selecting
low-skill jobs eventually expands with the C-globalization.
The results in this subsection suggest that from the point of view of the North, the
L-globalization gave incentives to select into middle-skill jobs. In this sense, trade com-
plemented middle skills during the L-globalization. However, this complementarity effect
diminishes and it is eventually overturned as the C-globalization progresses and more skill-
intensive tasks are offshored to the South. In addition to a reduction in the relative wage of
middle-skill workers, this generates a reduction in the mass of northern middle-skill agents.
For the South, trade complements skills in both globalizations.
Finally, note that the results for the Two Souths stated in Subsection 4.2 hold in this
extension of the model. The reason is that the relative wage of middle- to low-skill workers
behaves in the same manner as in the baseline model and its behavior is what drives the
results.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we provided a unified view of two globalization phases and analyzed their
interdependence. We distinguished between different trade cost reductions, (i) trade li-
beralizations in the 1980s, which increased trade in low-skill-intensive goods (denoted L-
Globalization) and (ii) reductions in communication costs due to the IT revolution, which
raised trade in middle-skill-intensive goods during the 1990s (denoted C-Globalization).
We considered a North-South trade economy in which the North is skill-abundant. A
final good is produced in the North employing high-skill agents and assembling a bundle of
inputs. Inputs are produced combining middle- and low-skill labor in different proportions
and can be purchased in the North or the South.
First, we analyzed the distributional effects of the globalization process. In the North,
we showed that wage inequality increases during the L-globalization. In contrast, wage
polarization emerges during the C-globalization. Our first main result highlighted the
complementarity between the two globalizations. Wage polarization is delayed by the extent
of L-globalization trade. We provided empirical evidence consistent with this result. We
found a positive relationship between trade openness before the onset of the IT revolution
and increases in lower-tail northern wage inequality in the 1990s. In the South, we showed
that wage inequality increases in both globalizations.
Second, we studied asymmetric participation in the C-globalization amongst southern
countries. We divided the original South in two identical southern countries and assumed
that only one of the two southern countries could open to the C-globalization. Our sec-
ond main result showed how this asymmetric trade participation generated a discontinuous
pattern of specialization. The country that participates in the C-globalization exports
C-globalization inputs and the least skill-intensive intermediates. As the C-globalization
progresses, the set of L-globalization intermediates in which this country has comparative
advantage shrinks, until complete specialization is reached. We provided evidence consis-
tent with the prediction of the model. We showed that as southern countries raise their
Internet adoption, they increase exports in RTI-intensive industries (C-globalization goods)
and decrease exports in low-skill-intensive industries (L-globalization goods).
Finally, we allowed for endogenous labor supply choices. We showed that the compara-
tive statics for relative wages hold in this generalized set-up. Moreover, we showed that the
mass of northern agents selecting into middle-skill jobs increases during the L-globalization
and eventually declines during the C-globalization, while the converse is true for the mass
of agents selecting into low-skill jobs.
In this paper we have emphasized the role of the IT revolution in allowing firms to
participate in the C-globalization. However, the C-globalization is also an outcome of the
adoption of new technologies that replace middle- and low-skill jobs. Therefore, we think
that an interesting extension of the two globalizations framework is to study the effect
of trade on the adoption of new technologies. In an on-line appendix we show that the
adoption of a new technology needed to benefit from C-globalization trade is delayed by
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the extent of trade in the L-globalization. We aim at pursuing this line of research to better
understand the complementarities between technology adoption and international trade.
Another research question which remains open and that has immediate policy implications
is to try to quantify the effects of the trade channels we propose versus other explanations,
such as immigration or pure technological change.
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A Proofs and Auxiliary Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2 Using equations (11) to (14) and the trade cost structure, (17),
the relative wages of middle-skill workers are
wNh
wNm
=
1− ϕ
ϕ
α
1− α
2
1− z2
I
− z2
II
+ z¯2
, (18)
wNm
wNl
=
1− z2
I
− z2
II
+ z¯2
(1− zI )2 + (1− zII )2 − (1− z¯)
2
1− θN
θN (1− ϕ)
, (19)
wSm
wSl
=
z2
I
+ z2
II
− z¯2
1− (1− zI )2 − (1− zII )2 + (1− z¯)
2
1− θS
θS
. (20)
The relative wage of high skill workers in the North increases with zII because the denom-
inator decreases with zII . Note that the same reasoning applies for the relative wage of
high- to low-skill workers. Taking the partial derivative of the relative wage of middle-skill
workers (19) in the North, we find that it is increasing in zII as long as zII < z˜II (zI ) ≡
1 + z¯ − zI −
√
2(z¯ − zI )(1− zI ). For the relative wage in the South, the sign of the partial
derivative with respect to zII is always positive.
Proof of Proposition 3 Direct differentiation of z˜II (zI ) yields to
2
1− 2zI + z¯√
2(z¯ − zI )(1− zI )
− 1. (21)
This expression is positive, and hence z˜II (zI ) increasing in zII . To see this, note that (21)
is positive if and only if
2
(
1
z¯ − zI
+
1
1− zI
)
> 1,
which is true because both fractions are greater than one.
Proposition 9 In the two Souths model of Subsection 4.2, all competitive equilibria in the
L-globalization have the same wage schedule for both Souths.
Proof First, note that the price function in country i is a geometric mean of the middle-
and low-skill wages. The price schedule in a country i, pi(z), is strictly monotone in z (if
the wages of middle- and low-skill agents are different). Thus the price functions can cross
at most once.
We proof the result by contradiction. Note that in autarky, the price of intermediates
were the same in both Souths (because both are identical) and that as a result of opening to
trade, the prices in the South strictly increase if there is positive demand from the North
in any good. Suppose that North demands the set of goods χ1 to Southeast and χ2 to
Southwest, where we are allowing for some traded intermediates z 6∈ χ1 ∩ χ2. Note that
intermediate z = 0 has to be produced only by one country, because otherwise the price in
both countries would be the same and by single crossing we cannot have an equilibrium.
Suppose Southeast produces it. To have an equilibrium we must have the prices crossing in
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the relevant range. This means that wSoutheastl < w
Southwest
l and that w
Southeast
m > w
Southwest
m .
In other words, the relative demand of middle-skill workers in Southeast is higher than in
Southwest. This implies that intermediates with low index z (low means below the threshold
at which the two prices cross) are cheaper in Southeast and yet there is more demand of
them in Southwest. This is a contradiction, unless both prices are equal, which implies
that wages are equal in Southeast and Southwest.
Proof of Proposition 4 For algebraic convenience we normalize the population size of
each southern country to one. Let f(z) denote the fraction of each intermediate z produced
by Southeast in the range z ∈ [0, zI ]. Thus, Southwest produces the remaining fraction
1 − f(z). Prices in both Souths will generically coincide if and only if wages of middle-
skill and low-skill workers are equalized in equilibrium. Denoting Ef [z] =
∫ zI
0 zf(z)dz,
equalization of middle-skill wages implies that Ef [z] =
1
2
∫ zI
0 zdz . Equalization of low-skill
wages implies that Ef [z] = 1−
1
2
∫ zI
0 (1− z)dz. This two conditions cannot be satisfied at
the same time, and thus, the price schedule will be different in Southeast and Southwest.
By an analogous reasoning of Proposition 9, prices can cross at most once. Thus, there
is a threshold equilibrium. Denote by zˇI the threshold intermediate. We show the result by
contradiction. Suppose that Southwest produces z ∈ [0, zˇI ] and that Southeast produces
z ∈ [zˇI , zI ] ∪ [z¯, zII ]. This can be an equilibrium if and only if w
Southwest
l < w
Southeast
l and
wSouthwestm > w
Southeast
m . These conditions on wages imply
0 < zI
(
1−
zI
2
)
− 2zˇI
(
1−
zˇI
2
)
+ zII
(
1−
zII
2
)
− z¯I
(
1−
z¯I
2
)
,
0 < 2zˇ2
I
− z2
I
− z2
II
+ z¯2
I
,
which cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Thus this cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5 The threshold zˇI can be expressed implicitly as the solution
to the problem pSoutheast(z) = pSouthwest(z) for some z ∈ [0, zI ], where if the equality is not
satisfied, then either 0 or zI is the solution, depending on whether the price schedule of
Southeast is above or below the price schedule of Southwest for z ∈ [0, zI ]. Using that in
order to have an equilibrium middle-skill wages are higher in Southeast and low-skill wages
are lower in Southeast, we have that the geometric average with parameter z
(
wSoutheastm
wSouthwestm
)z (
wSoutheastl
wSouthwestl
)1−z
(22)
will be exactly one by some z between zero and one. Consider an interior solution for
z. Inspection of the explicit equation (22) shows that both the ratios of middle-skill and
low-skill wages in Southeast to Southwest are decreasing in zI and increasing in zII and zˇI .
As result, and using implicit derivation, it follows that in this range zˇI (zI , zII ) is increasing
in zI and decreasing in zII . Letting A ≡
wSoutheastm
wSouthwestm
and B ≡
wSoutheast
l
wSouthwest
l
, the expression for the
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implicit derivatives of zˇI becomes, after some manipulation,
∂zˇI
∂zi
[
lnA− lnB +
zˇI
A
∂A
∂zˇI
+
(1− zˇI )
B
∂B
∂zˇI
]
= −
zˇI
A
∂A
∂zi
−
(1− zˇI )
B
∂B
∂zi
, (23)
where i = {I, II}. The sign of the term in brackets in the left hand side is positive for all
i and the term on the right hand side is positive for zI and negative for zII . Thus, the sign
of the derivative of the threshold zˇI with respect to zi is unambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 6 The relative wages in Southeast and Southwest are proportional
to
wSoutheastm
wSoutheastl
∝
zˇ2
I
+ z2
II
− z¯2
1− (1− zˇI )2 − (1− zII )2 + (1− z¯)2
,
wSouthwestm
wSouthwestl
∝
z2
I
− zˇ2
I
(1− zˇI )2 − (1− zI )2
.
From Proposition 5, the relative wage in Southwest is decreasing in zII for the range in
which there is an interior solution for zˇI and is constant otherwise. For the relative wage
in Southeast, if zˇI = 0, it is immediate to check that the relative wage is increasing in zII .
If zˇI > 0, we first show that a sufficient condition for the relative wage being increasing is
that |∂zˇI/∂zII | < 1. If this is the case, the change induced in zˇI by an infinitesimal change
ε in zII is bounded below by zI − ε. Algebraic manipulation shows that as long as zII > zˇI
(which is true by assumption), the relative wage is increasing in zII .
To show that |∂zˇI/∂zII | < 1, we show that an upper bound of this derivative is less
than one,
zˇI
A
∂A
∂zII
+ (1−zˇI )
B
∂B
∂zII
zˇI
A
∂A
∂zˇI
+ (1−zˇI )
B
∂B
∂zˇI
< 1.
This condition reduces to
−2zˇIzI + zI + zˇI
(zI − zˇI )(zI + zˇI − 2)(zI + zˇI )
+
zˇI (zII − zˇI )
zˇ2
I
+ z2
II
− z¯2
+
(zˇI − 1)(zˇI − zII )
(zˇI − 2)zˇI + (zII − z¯)(zII + z¯ − 2)
< 0,
which is true given that 0 < zˇI < zI < z¯ ≤ zII < 1.
Proof of Proposition 7 The indifference conditions can be rewritten as
J¯ε
α
1− α
(2 + ε)
1− J¯2+ε
=
1− z2
I
− z2
II
+ z¯2
J¯2 − j¯N2
, (24)
j¯N
1− z2
I
− z2
II
+ z¯2
J¯2 − j¯N2
=
(1− zI )
2 + (1− zII )
2 − (1− z¯)2
2j¯N
, (25)
s¯S(j¯S)
z2
I
+ z2
II
− z¯2∫ 1
j¯S
sS(j)dj
=
1− (1− zI )
2 − (1− zII )
2 + (1− z¯)2
j¯S
. (26)
Consider the case for the South. Equation (26) can be rewritten as
∫ 1
j¯S
sS(j)dj
2j¯S s¯S(j¯S)
=
θS
(1− θS)
wSm
wSl
, (27)
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where the expression for the wages corresponds to section 4. Thus, the right hand side of
equation (27) is increasing in zI . The left hand side of (27) is decreasing in j¯
S . Therefore,
j¯S is decreasing in zI . Note that the relative wage of a middle-skill agent can be written as
wSm
wSl
=
sS(j)
sS(j¯S(zI ))
. (28)
Thus, the relative wage in the South increases with zI .
Consider the case for the North. Given that ε is a small positive number, we assume
that 2 + ε ≈ 2. Under this simplifying assumption, we find
J¯2 =
(1 +A)C
1 + (1 +A)C
, (29)
j¯N
2
=
AC
1 + (1 +A)C
, (30)
where A = (1−zI )
2+(1−zII )
2−(1−z¯)2
2(1−z2
I
−z2
II
+z¯2)
and C = (1−α)
α
1−z2
I
−z2
II
+z¯2
2 . In the L-globalization zII = z¯,
thus, A and C (and AC ) are decreasing in zI . Therefore, J¯ and j¯
N are decreasing in zI .
Finally, note that the size of middle agents is
J¯
j¯N
=
√
1 +A
A
, (31)
which increases in the L-globalization. Finally, relative wages are
wNh
wNm
=
j1+
J¯ (zI )
, (32)
wNm
wNl
=
j
j¯N (zI )
, (33)
which are increasing in zI .
Proof of Proposition 8 For the South, the same reasoning as in Proposition 7 applies.
For the North, the comparative statics are as in Proposition 7, while A is decreasing.
However, when zII > z˜II (zI ), A increases. From equation (31), it follows that the mass of
middle- skill workers declines. The comparative statics for the mass of high-skill workers
does not depend on A, but on AC, which is unambiguously decreasing in zII . From equation
(29), this implies that the threshold J¯ is decreasing in zII . From equation (32), this implies
that the relative wage of high skill agents is increasing. The threshold j¯N is implicitly
defined by equation (30). Taking the total derivative of (30) with respect to zII , we can
isolate dj¯N/dzII . Evaluating this derivative at zII = z¯ and zII = 1, shows that the derivative
takes negative and positive values, respectively. Moreover, it is immediate to check that
the derivative is continuous and monotone. Intuitively, monotonicity follows from the
derivatives of A and C being monotone. Thus, by the Bolzano theorem, we know that
there is a unique threshold for zII , above which dj¯
N/dzII > 0. Note that this threshold
is above z˜II (defined in Proposition 2) because ∂A/∂zII |zII=z˜II = 0, and from the implicit
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derivation of equation (30), it follows that dj¯N/dzII |zII=z˜II < 0.
B Data Appendix
World bilateral trade flows are taken from Feenstra database, Feenstra et al. (2005). We
obtain U.S. tariff data at industry level for the period 1978-1988 from Feenstra database.
Feenstra’s data is available from http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/. For the period 1990-2000, we
use Romalis database, available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.romalis/more/.
Transportation costs are cost of insurance and freight over customs import value from
Feenstra database. Data on U.S. imports comes from Feenstra database.
We construct a skill intensity index by using 5 percent U.S. census data from IPUMS.
The skill intensity variable is constructed assigning a score to each level of education re-
ported in the US Census, using the variable educ99. We average across industries by same
NAICS and across occupations when noted in the main text.
We take the routine-intensity index (RTI) from Autor and Dorn (2009). Roughly speak-
ing, using the Dictionary of Tasks each task can be divided into three characteristics (ab-
stract, routine and manual) and it is assigned a score for each of the three entries. The
RTI index represents the importance of the routine part for each task. See Autor and Dorn
(2009) for further discussion.
Internet measures are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI), avail-
able from the World Bank. For the robustness checks, the financial development measure
is domestic credit to private sector over GDP. Human capital is the fraction of the labor
force with secondary education. Both measures are obtained from the World Development
Indicators (WDI).
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Figure 1: Changes in southern exports to the North in industries with above average U.S.
skill intensity. The mean skill intensity of U.S. industries is measured using educational attainment in
U.S. Census. North is defined as having more than 50 percent of U.S. GDP per capita (PPP adjusted).
Source: Feenstra World Trade Database. Note that data pre- and post-1984 come from different sources
(Feenstra et al., 2005).
Table 1: Trade Costs and Pattern of Specialization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whole Sample South
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A: Dependent Variable is U.S. Imports in 1990
Tariff -6.77 -8.20
(2.31) (2.56)
Observations 26397 12642
Panel B: Dependent Variable is U.S. Imports in 2000
Tariff -3.46 -4.07 -4.05 -1.29 -1.49 -1.48
(2.47) (2.43) (3.62) (2.88) (2.89) (2.57)
Internet · Skill Intensity 6.30 6.09 9.59 8.07
(5.03) (.93) (2.66) (1.64)
Observations 262303 261961 261961 126891 126549 126549
Standard errors are clustered by country in the OLS regressions, robust standard errors in the
2SLS. A southern country is defined as having less than half of 2000 U.S. GDP per capita adjusted
by PPP from the Penn World Tables. RTI index is used as instrument of Skill Intensity in the
first stage regressions, which are omitted. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects.
Dependent variable is U.S. Imports from Feenstra’s NBER Dataset. Tariff is U.S. Tariffs at HS6
level from Romalis’ Dataset. Skill intensity is mean level of education from U.S. Census for industry.
Internet is the fraction of population with access to Internet in 2000. See Appendix B for detailed
data definitions and sources.
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Table 2: Change in Trade Openness and Wage Bill in the U.S.
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Wage Bill 80-90 ∆ Wage Bill 90-96
∆ Trade Openness 80-90 · Skill Int. 1.65
(.43)
∆ Trade Openness 90-96 · Skill Int. .29 -4.62
(.17) (2.17)
∆ Trade Openness 90-96 · Skill Int.2 .23
(.10)
Observations 118 118 118
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. ∆ Trade Openness is the change in the share of exports
and imports over GDP from the Penn World Tables. Wage bill data at industry level at 3-digit
NAICS comes from Autor et al. (1998). Skill intensity is the mean level of education from U.S.
Census by industry.
Table 3: Complementarity in the North
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample G-7 Countries
Dep. Var.: Change in 50/10 wage in the 1990s
Trade Openness 1990 .22 .20 .22 .24
(.09) (.10) (.08) (.15)
Income per capita -.005 .003
(.01) (.02)
Observations 19 19 7 7
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. All regressions include an intercept. The change in
50/10 wage inequality comes from the LIS data, to which we add Japan from the OECD. We
restrict the LIS sample to countries that have more than 50% of U.S. income per capita. The LIS
data are taken from rounds V and III. Trade Openness of a Northern country is defined as the share
of exports to and imports from Southern countries over GDP from the Penn World Tables in 1990.
The income per capita data are taken from Penn World Tables for 1995. Since we do not have data
for Germany prior 1991, we use data for trade openness in 1991 instead of 1990 for Germany.
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Table 4: Testing the Moving Band
(1) (2)
Dep. Var.: ∆Imp.
∆Internet δC(z) .053 .091
(.015) (.025)
∆Internet δL(z) -.049 -.047
(.013) ( .012)
Obs. 1705 1705
Standard errors are clustered by country. All regressions include an intercept. Dependent
variable is change in U.S. southern imports between 1990 and 2000. U.S. Imports data are from
Feenstra’s NBER Dataset. ∆Internet is the fraction of the population with access to Internet in
2000. There are no data for Internet adoption in 1990 and it was presumably negligible for most
of the sample. δL(z) = (1− δC(z)) ∗ δlow(z), where δlow(z) is a dummy for industry z taking value
of one for industries below the average skill requirement. δC(z) is a dummy taking value of one for
industry z with the RTI index above the 50th and 66th percentile of the distribution in columns 1
and 2, respectively. A southern country is defined as having less than 50 percent of U.S. GDP per
capita (PPP adjusted). See the Appendix B for detailed data definitions and sources.
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Figure 2: Changes in U.S. imports from India and Chile for different skill levels. For
comparability with our tariff data, we can only consider the period 1978-1988 for the L-Globalization. For
India, the series starts in 1992 to dampen the effect of the trade liberalization in 1991, documented in
Topalova (2005) among others. Source: Feenstra U.S. Imports Database, Skill Intensity constructed from
U.S. Census.
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(a) Skill Content of Southern Exports in industries
with skill requirement below U.S. average.
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(b) Skill Content of Southern Exports in industries
with skill requirement above U.S. average.
Figure 3: Skill Content of Southern Exports. The skill content is the weighted average of
the skill embodied in southern exports. The skill intensity of U.S. industries is measured using
educational attainment in U.S. Census. North is defined as having more than 50 percent of U.S.
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted). Source: Feenstra World Trade Database.
(a) Changes in U.S. Tariffs by Skill in the L-
Globalization. (Two Std. Dev. bars). Source:
Feenstra tariff data.
(b) Changes in U.S. Tariffs by Skill in the C-
Globalization. (One Std. Dev. bars). Source: Ro-
malis tariff data.
Figure 4: Changes in U.S. Tariffs by Skill.Source: Feenstra database for panel A and Romalis
database for panel B.
Figure 5: Changes in U.S. Transportation Costs (Insurance and Freight). One Std. Dev. bars
are shown. Source: Feenstra database.
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Figure 6: Examples of RTI for Selected Occupations. Source: Autor and Dorn (2009).
Figure 7: Average Skill Intensity by U.S. Industry. Source: Autor and Dorn (2009).
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Figure 8: Interdependence in the North. This plot assumes z¯ = 1/2. The dashed line is for zI = 0,
dotted for zI = .2 and regular line for zI = .3.
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Figure 9: Changes in U.S. imports from India and Pakistan for different skill levels. Source:
Feenstra U.S. Imports Database.
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